Egg in one hand: Akan (Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire) people’s symbol for insinuating that “Power is fragile. Like an egg. Hold it too tightly, and it might break and spill all over the hand. Yet hold it too loosely, and it might fall, break, and splatter all over the floor.”—Ed.


Cover Concept and Design: Jose V. Ciprut
Democracy is not in steady state, and democratizations are open-ended processes; they depend on structures and functions in systemic contexts that idiosyncratically evolve in tone, tenor, direction, and pace over time. They also affect and are in turn affected by scores of determinants—both perceived and hypothetical—presumed to inform outcomes. These factors include distinct socioeconomic or cultural/normative prerequisites, historical “path dependency” arguments, homogeneity versus heterogeneity considerations, and, not least, actors’ choices. All of these relate to external and internal environments that, deliberately or not, shape the evolution of human development and have an impact on personal and societal emancipation in idiosyncratic ways.

Power-analytical understandings of idealistic explanations and hybrid formulations for democratizations abound. As is evident from its title, the premise of this book is that, although certain basic traits tend to characterize democracy\(^1\) as “ideology,”\(^2\) not all of the practicable paths to it offer the same vistas and vicissitudes, and not all roads lead to the same putative terminus, smack at the center of a movable end station. In fact, precipitous starts, unpreventable breakdowns, contingent digressions, parallel pursuits, and fundamental changes in circumstances—whether by redirecting journeys or renaming destinations—can transform democratizations, in theory and practice. Among factors that complicate facile explanations are the perceived

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1. “Be nice to America,” reads teasingly a red, white, and blue bumper sticker placed on the tail end of a 1966 Imperial Crown convertible proudly kept alive in an oil-poor country known for its populist slogans, “or we’ll bring democracy to your country.”
correlative relationship between democracy and diversity/asymmetry on the one hand and democracy and equality versus uniformity on the other.

In a few interlinked chapters, this book reexamines the basic traits, the comparable outcomes, and the self-defining dynamics of some of the more widely attempted versions of democracy across the world. It discusses several of the more pressing if less understood controversies that can speed up or retard democratizations, depending on the systemic structures, functions, processes, and contexts at play inside, outside, and across political boundaries. And it concludes with an eye to ‘the future’. Of particular focus are the comparable merits of democracy’s long-alleged pursuits and destinations, their distinct implications and consequences for a mode of citizenship exercisable in a viable ethic of freedom, and the role of settings in many of which masses of human beings still today somehow find themselves struggling under less than adequate conditions of liberty.

If, as purported, democratizations truly are about dissipating asymmetries, decreasing top-down dominations, encouraging and even speeding up asymptotic approaches to ideals of self-liberty pregnant with collective progress, without danger of internal contradictions on questions of egalitarianism and “social leveling,” might it not be useful to revisit the thoughts and the practices that have, and still very much do, foster such emancipation? Hence the cross-disciplinary investigation in this book, the innate logic of which—reflected via the sequence of its chapters—pursues the questions of how democratizations might have an impact on the future of citizenship and in which ways, under what proper circumstances, they might even lead to a political ethic of freedom.

From Rule of Law to Freedoms to Enlightened Self-Government

In his chapter, International Relations specialist Charles Doran holds that democratic pluralism in contemporary democratic polities will become even more crucial as immigration and especially differential birth rates make those societies more diverse. Tolerance enhances the capacity of democratic pluralism to create within the global polity of the twenty-first century what its members will identify as the ‘just society’. How so, one may ask. Doran provides a plausibly clear and detailed argument: ‘Democratization’ is the process of becoming democratic, whereas ‘law’ within democracy is institutionalized democrati-
zation. Democratization is thus the foremost political process in the twenty-first century. But among countries (because many are still undemocratic) as well as within any single country (because the process is still unperfected), processes of democratization are far from complete, although admittedly unending. Three primary values underlie democratization: equality before the law, freedom, and tolerance. In historical time, the achievement of individual freedom and the freedom of the nation state (autonomy) for the most part precedes the achievement of equality before the law, not only inside the state but also outside of it—within the international system. But tolerance is the laggard political value, an “unfulfilled idea” in many modern polities and one not forthrightly attempted in many illiberal states.

Democratic pluralism, which encourages political tolerance among individuals and communities, is therefore central to greater levels of democratization today. Focus on democratic pluralism will become more important as the great democratic polities become more culturally and ethnically diverse via the impact of immigration and as a consequence of differential birth rates among communal groups. But reforms of democratic institutions of democracy cannot yield greater benefit until and unless democratic pluralism enhances political tolerance and in turn can be enhanced by newfound tolerance inside the modern democratic polity. Critiques on issues of tolerance aside, might the time not have come for a critical reassessment of the forms of liberal democracy, in its various theoretical and practical modes?

Liberal Democracy: Interrogating the Premises and the Inferences

Political philosopher and theorist Aryeh Botwinick’s chapter examines the theoretical considerations of democratizations under the processes of representative versus participatory democracy. Liberal democracy—the present form of government of, by, and for the citizens of the United States, for instance—represents the institutionalization of a delicate balance of tensions. ‘Democracy’ connotes popular rule, a mode of direct input by citizens in the formation of their country’s government. ‘Liberal’, by contrast, conjures up a multitude of ways in which democracy is deflected, channeled, and even blocked, the better to protect

3. Tolerance may be mistaken for a high-handed mannerism of condescendence, which it is not, when “toleration” is mutual and practiced in reciprocation. An in-depth overview of its dilemmas is offered in Heyd (1996).
minority rights. As Madison classically argued in *Federalist No. 10*, representation itself is a key device for frustrating popular rule because it places political decision making in the hands of a cadre of professional politicians who are already removed from the scene of popular agitation and whose routine professional ethos consists of reaching compromises with other similarly situated individuals. Political theorist Sheldon Wolin has been an eloquent critic of liberal democracy, at least partially because of the ways it plays into the hands of corporate elites bent on thwarting majority rule for the sake of enhancing their economic interests.\(^4\) Robert Dahl, in the later stages of his career, has argued in favor of a natural extension of the logic of democracy, from the exclusions sanctioned by ‘liberal’ democracy to the greater inclusiveness promoted and nurtured by ‘participatory’ democracy. He went so far as to suggest that the next area for the application of participatory democracy ought to be none other than the workplace. Because so much of that space had already become public, he reasoned, did it not make sense to go the distance (of politicization) and enforce democratic norms throughout the vast interior of that expanse.

Peter Bachrach and Aryeh Botwinick, too, have argued that, as concerns democracy, the workplace needs to be theorized and designed as a locus for raising the consciousness of ordinary citizens about justifications for greater equality in decision-making procedures and for greater equality in the distribution of the wealth of the society across its life space, in the belief that ultimately this development should likely generate rippling restructuring effects on political governance as a whole. Dahl, Bachrach, and Botwinick have been deeply concerned with sustaining the liberal guarantees of minority rights even as they went on encouraging exertions of majority rule to become more efficacious and also more egalitarian. By contrast, Wolin has become more apocalyptic in his willingness to dispense with these liberal protections.\(^5\)

In chapter 3, Botwinick considers the question of the metaphysical backdrop to liberal democracy: Does it grow out of certainty or skepti-

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\(^4\) Cf. Shlapentokh, chapter 8 in this book, on elites’ roles in, and popular appetites for, democracy within state-led pursuit of democratization across Russia today.

\(^5\) As a participant in our cross-disciplinary seminar, Dr. Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, deemed it useful to remind us, focus on the liberal defense of minority rights may not be seen inadvertently to conflate two very distinct notions: that (1) liberalism is more about individual rights and the right to be different and (2) the concept of minority rights is practically always exclusively on group rights. Need one here overemphasize that liberalism usually prefers individual rights over group rights?
cism? What varieties of certainty and which types of skepticism? Might reorienting one’s concerns over the theoretical bearings of liberal democracy help in achieving greater clarity with regard to questions of institutional design and efficacy? In an era of rampant globalization, which often serves as a veiled reference to the speed and efficacy with which ‘Western’ (read ‘American’) political and economic models penetrate the far corners of the world, this chapter provides a theoretical exploration of what in essence the political project of postmodern and postindustrial society might be about in an epoch of broader democratization and faster globalization.

**Globalizations and Democratizations: Forces, Counterforces**

The dynamics of social development by which systems increase their scale (i.e., the level of their integrated diversity) are the forces that also underlie both globalization and democratization. The globalization experienced in our epoch began in the mid-1970s and was ‘pushed’ initially by market integration; it subsequently began to fuse gradually with processes of democratization. Globalization and democratization remain two important parts of human society’s developmental processes worldwide. So argues, in chapter 4, political scientist Henry Teune, who has studied these forces for a long time.

Teune uses three theoretical approaches to explain globalization at different levels of generality. First, he argues that social systems have a developmental logic of generating variety, by dispersing the resultant diversity, then integrating it, and as a result increasing their own scale. This increased scale becomes an environment that speeds up the creation of variety, the spread of diversity, and the integration of that diversity. Second, individuals, groups, and organizations seek in the long run to maximize their contacts with other such entities, through the fewest nodes possible. And over time, this process, which is one of rational learning, evolves into a structure of highly integrated components on a worldwide basis. Third, both globalization and democratization have come about through confluences of historical events, and this state of affairs has led to more political systems seeking to open themselves to the benefits of ‘the rest of the world’ and, of necessity, basing their legitimacy on democratic processes that receive approval from other political systems.

Teune’s chapter discusses myriad resistances to the forces of globalization in terms of general dialectics and specific conflicts. The two
main dialectical dynamics that carry potential to destabilize processes of globalization and democratization are argued to be (1) between levels of development [here, diversity spreads among levels within the system (and world)], which have the greatest extant diversity but also to levels with little or no diversity; the first kind of flow is faster than the second and hence accelerates inequalities; and (2) between the rates of diversification and those of integration [note that here, because it occurs much quicker than its integration, diversity pulls a system (and world) apart in the process of accommodating what is novel].

These dialectics lead to conflicts among economic and social strata, regions, and the old and new developmental elites. Teune sees the forces of globalization winning in the long run, despite battles that may take place between pushes of the global and pulls of the local threatened by it, in new modes of wars of resistance worldwide. Might a more accommodating category of inclusive governance provide a long-term resolution of the shorter-term and medium-term difficulties prognosticated by this chapter, in preemptive ways? Might not, say, federalism, in its growing array of forms, provide a timely answer?

Federalism: The Highest Stage of Democracy?

For veteran of the subject and seasoned political scientist John Kincaid, federalism is arguably the highest stage of democracy because it makes democracy possible on a large scale and in a wide variety of ways that combine the advantages of large and small republics. The world’s twenty-five federal countries already encompass 39 percent of the world’s population. The average land area and population of federal countries are much larger than those of other nations, and federal countries are also the most culturally heterogeneous. On indicators of democracy, freedom, rights, economic development, and quality of life, federal countries seem to perform better than unitary countries and as well as or better than decentralized unitary countries. Through dispersed power and multiple arenas of government—national, regional, and local—federalism seems to enhance opportunities for citizen participation, to offer multiple forums for citizen voice, to protect the liberties of both persons and cultural communities, to accommodate cultural heterogeneity through regional and local self-government without insisting on uniformity, and to provide means to hold public officials accountable to the people, while also promoting justice by better matching public benefits to public burdens and by allowing
some diversity of ideas of justice where universal agreement is not possible. Although federalism by itself is neither a panacea nor a guarantor of democracy, argues Kincaid, for some countries, it is the only viable form of democracy, whereas in others it enhances democracy. And he deploys comparative figures to buttress his considered contention.

But, then, how do the theoretical considerations covered so far manifest themselves around the world and with what typical concerns and consequences?

**Democratizing the European Union: With or without a Sovereign Demos?**

There still is no model for democracy on the supranational level in the European Union. Yet, the debate about the Union’s so-called ‘democratic deficit’ is coming of age. Democracy is commonly assumed to be

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6. The European Union (EU) was formed by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 as a political-economic union across a geocultural space that constitutes almost all of Greater Christian Europe. It holds a population of almost 500 million, over a space of 4.3 million km²; spanning 27 member states (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). It generates approximately 30 percent of the world’s nominal gross domestic product. On a waiting list are three official candidate countries (Croatia, the former-Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and a secular Muslim democracy—the Republic of Turkey). Officially recognized potential candidate countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and now Kosovo as well. The EU rises on the foundations of the pre-existing European Economic Community (EEC), itself created by the Treaty of Paris on July 23, 1952, among France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Italy—dubbed the ‘inner six’, for being the founding members also of the Union’s de facto predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in 1951, and for having ratified the Treaties of Rome on March 25, 1957. Of the ‘outer seven’ (UK, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Austria, and Switzerland), who, on January 1, 1960, had signed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Convention in Stockholm (taking effect on May 3, 1960) and later admitted Finland as a full member, the UK (with it, the British Overseas Territory of Gibraltar) and Denmark joined The Community in 1973, the year Ireland adhered. After gaining home rule from Denmark and conducting a referendum, Greenland left the community in 1985, remaining an overseas territory. If Greece joined in 1981, Portugal did so only in 1986, the year Spain became a member; and Austria, Sweden, and Finland became members in 1995, but Norway had to withdraw its (accepted) application for membership when its people voted against joining. Following ‘the fall of the Berlin Wall’, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, on one hand, and, on the other hand, the island countries of Malta and Cyprus, joined at the same time, on May 1, 2004. Bulgaria and Romania would follow suit in January
based on certain prerequisites still regarded to be missing in the EU: statehood, well-defined territorial boundaries, a supreme decision-making authority, a clearly delineated citizenry as the subject of law, and a preexisting politicocultural identity of sorts, among them. The failure of member states to adopt a binding constitution for the European Union in 2005, and the Irish reticence in 2008 to ratify the Lisbon Treaty of December, 12, 2007, warrant political scientist and historian Andreas Heinemann-Grüder’s critical comparison of the merits of the dominant modes of dealing with the ‘democratic deficit’ of the European Union. Many rivalries seem at play:

Adherents of a collectivist or communitarian conception of the demos conventionally assume that, in order to occur and survive, a democracy requires not only a good measure of cultural and social homogeneity but a vibrant civilian society as well. As long as these prerequisites are

2007. The European Economic Area (EEA), created by the EC and EFTA on January 1, 1994, and extending to all of the EU members since, now allows residual EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland), bound among themselves by the Vaduz Convention, which has long replaced the Stockholm Convention, to participate also in the European Single Market without joining the EU. Switzerland enjoys bilateral treaties. And a very effective cooperation including privileged use of the Euro extends to Europe’s micro-city-states (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City), as well. Although the marathon negotiations brokered as a last hurrah by the outgoing EU President, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in Brussels, at dawn, on Saturday, June 23, 2007, had somehow succeeded in transmuting longstanding reservations into last-minute concessions toward producing a draft Reform Treaty—hard-nosed pursuits of self-interest by the UK, the Netherlands, and Poland, notwithstanding—the way things have developed since provides a good example of the great many difficulties intrinsic to the political process of translating ideas to intents, intents to will, will to attitude, to signatures, and to action capable of transforming an aggregate into a functioning system.

7. The Lisbon treaty was conceived as ‘Plan B’, following the French and Dutch “non”/ “nee” to a European Constitution. It was drawn with the intent of streamlining decision-making across an enlarged EU. On June 13, 2008, it was rejected (by a vote of 53.4 percent) by the Irish. As this volume goes to press, only 21 of the 27 EU members have ratified it. It remains dependent on parliamentary approval in the Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, and still awaits formal presidential signature in Germany and Poland. This development promises to provide another significant test for the ends and means of European-wide democratization. On July 16, 2008, rumors were that under the newly inaugurated French Presidency, there might exist “a plan to stage a rerun of the vote backed by guarantees that Ireland will keep its EU commissioner as well as its military neutrality, its veto over tax policy and its right to set its abortion laws.” More on this is available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4340086.ece. A visit to Ireland by the newly elected EU President, Mr. Sarkozy, could not afford to be seen as anything other than a courtesy visit. And not much more than that it certainly ended up being. The transformation of an aggregate into a system will likely require a broader sense of citizenship by a few inclined to cater to their narrow national interests first.
missing on the European level, they tend to argue, national statehood at the member state level should remain by far the more appropriate institutional framework for democracy. From a liberalist point of view, it has been argued moreover that further supranational state building in the European Union would undermine accountability, participatory rights, and, above all, freedom, were it for creating a Leviathan ever more detached from its populaces. According to this ‘Euroskeptical-liberalist’ point of view, the EU should embody and further ‘broaden’ the space governed by liberal rights while refraining from ‘deepening’ further. ‘Intergovernmentalists’ in principle deny democracy any possibility for legitimizing inputs, concentrating instead on output legitimization. In sum, as long as the EU’s policy output does not fundamentally dissatisfy the electorates, they deem that the EU can be regarded as legitimate, whether democratic or not.

In contrast, the Euro-optimists claim to see a solution to the democratic deficit: in institution building or in the strengthening of existing institutions. At the core of this institutional approach is the call for parliamentarizing the EU, for instance by holding the EU executive accountable, by broadening the law-making capacities of the European Parliament, by strengthening the decision-making capacities in the Council, and by emboldening the citizenries through arrangements easing a pan-European mode of direct democracy (via referenda, plebiscites, consultations of all sorts at all levels, for example).

Still others do not even care about the democratic credentials of the EU and argue in favor of ‘a European empire’ as an alternative to U.S. hegemony, something able to copy while capably checking and balancing ‘It’. There exists also a loose camp, one imbued with republican views for democratizing the EU, pursuing by and large the considerations originally laid out by German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas. This camp starts with the sweeping observation that the traditional premises of national homogeneity erode the coherence of traditional group interests, the overlap of social milieus, political parties, and hence of national identities. Multilevel governance, ‘deliberative politics’, pan-European media, transnational networks, transnational public discourses, surely also transnational grass-root movements, and party systems, they argue, would constitute a new form of communitarization ‘beyond the nation-state’. Somehow, it seems assumed, expected, or hoped that the prerequisites of democracy are already in place, in a state of infancy but progressively evolving. The failure of the referenda on the EU Constitution in France and in
the Netherlands brought the mainly elite-guided and “ideology”-driven pattern of legitimizing the EU to a sudden halt. For the time being—that is, for the next five to ten years—it seems that there will not be any further widening or deepening of the EU but rather a protracted lapse permitting ‘digestion’, the better to cope with the EU’s (hasty?) expansion into Eastern Europe and into a few more Southern European countries too. True, some unpredictable external factors may intervene: shared manifest challenges or common threat perceptions may ‘deepen’ the purview of joint decision making, but opposite views among the member states with regard to external threats might prove disruptive for the EU as well. This is my take on Heinemann-Grüder’s thoughts on what is a complex matter laden with compounding, interlacing, and overlapping considerations.

It is only following the ongoing period of slow digestion that yet another attempt to ‘constitutionalize’ the EU might well be undertaken. In the meantime, however, the Europeanization of lawmaking and justice will proceed—at creeping pace. And although the prospects that extra rounds of enlargement—after the Balkans, next to the Ukraine, Belarus, and (why not?) Turkey, or the Caucasus—may beget

8. The agreements reached in Brussels on June 23, 2007, over a Reform Treaty had come up with something to satisfy everyone: for instance, the UK (adamant on maintaining national control over foreign policy, justice, and home affairs) because it made it “absolutely clear that the charter on fundamental rights [was] not going to be justiciable in British courts or alter British law,” as publicly stated by the outgoing British Prime Minister Tony Blair; they pleased also the Netherlands, because the role of national parliaments in Europe would be thereby strengthened and because the criteria for new members eager to join the EU were explicitly included in the treaty. Yet one still was not quite certain that these quasi-accords at long last did suit all members. Why? Because the new system labeled ‘double majority’, and earmarked for phase-in as of 2014 for full implementation in 2017, requires that fully a 55 percent majority of EU member states and at least 65 percent of the EU population approve a change by their vote; and because it also vies to include most of the central points of the aborted Constitution, such as fewer national veto powers, more and greater powers for the European Parliament, a slimmer European Commission, and a singular role and budget for a Foreign Affairs Chief, as also a longer-term/full-time President of the European Council (the venue where the presidents and prime ministers of the twenty-seven member states consult regularly). In addition, the time span allowed until full implementation (ten very long years, until 2017) should offer inordinate space and latitude for spoilers to renegotiate the Brussels agreement—let alone that the debate over a Constitution is far from over, appearances to the contrary (catchy leitmotiv “that book is forever closed”), quite aside.

9. “Why not? Well, because this great nation is in Asia Minor, not in Europe,” retorted candidate to the French Presidency Nicolas Sarkozy in a televised debate, on May 2, 2007, to his competitor Ségolène Royal, who somehow failed to ask him why then, Cyprus—an island situated in the south of Turkey, but unlike Turkey, with no national territory on European soil—was allowed into the EU. (Readers may recall that it was Greece’s
liberalizing-democratizing impacts and outcomes in each of these countries situated on Europe’s anecdotal fringes, a too convenient way of stemming the periphery-to-center flow of economic migrants into the Metropole will remain a priority to address in defensive postures for the foreseeable future. The political activities of some of the naturalized EU citizens who were not so long ago subjects of the countries they emigrated from would seem to indicate that some of these good folk tend to become more and more like who they once were as they come to acquaint themselves with greater freedoms. And as to the EU, it is our view that it is unlikely to overcome soon or in any substantial manner its still weak ‘input legitimacy’, its flawed checks and balances, and—disconcerting in its own right—it’s conspicuous lack of intermediary organizations so essential for articulating manifest forms of sovereign democratic governance. It is, however, one’s thoughtful wishing that ultimately the truth—and nothing but the ever-evolving truths in and around it—shall set the EU free . . . of itself.  

**Democratizations in Central Europe: Comparative Aspects**

Central Europe has merited and received much attention in reference to its experiments with democracy and democratization, even well before the definitive dismemberment of the Soviet Empire. Among the questions examined, issues of transitions from dictatorship (McFaul 2005), of noncooperative or ‘compromise’ switch overs (McFaul 2002), of preemptive stances (Silitski 2005), of the innate dynamics (Way 2006), of international linkages (Levitsky and Way 2005), and of the factor of youth and societal mobilization (Kuzio 2006) have generated interest, as have debates toward explaining successes and failures (D’Anieri 2006), fathoming ‘international diffusion’ (Bunce and Wolchik 2006),

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10. Further expansion—be it to the East or to the South, even after the recommended period of “digestive integration”—seems to fuel, still today, especially among the pursuers of a “political Europe,” preemptive fears of “dilution and death” of that very ideal, itself an elite-entertained aspiration of what for these minds is but Europe’s eternal and unalienable reason to be. In that view, an at long last thoroughly democratically integrated political EU should gain even greater security if democratizations occurred at its fringes through special partnerships across a **nova mare nostrum**, textured by accords throughout the Mediterranean Basin and, with time, maybe even beyond—for as long as little if any reason is left or allowed for immigration.
remembering ‘the origins of the Ukraine’s democratic breakthrough’ (Aslund and McFaul 2006), and understanding the challenges of ‘reclaiming democracy’ in Central and Eastern Europe (Forbrig and Demeš 2007).

For Polish military sociologist Jerzy Wiatr, the states still referred to as ‘post-communist’, in East and Central Europe, comprise a great variety of cases, which differ from each other on account of factors including: (1) the nature of the old regime (say, from rigid totalitarian to benign authoritarian), (2) the type of economy (from the fully nationalized ‘command’ types to manifold forms of ‘mixed’ practice), (3) the degree of ‘latitude’ for autonomy (from independent national communist regimes, to communist regimes dependent on Moscow, to the former Republics of the USSR), and (4) the ethnic makeup or general composition (from multiethnic state, to national entity with strong ethnic minorities, to homogeneous national state), although these countries differ also in (5) the way they have swerved from communism (whether through negotiated transition, by a top-down abortive coup, via the collapse of the regime or the disintegration of the multiethnic state), and, not least, (6) the set of policies pursued by the post-communist elites, distinctively during the early years of the transition specific to a particular country.

In the nineteen years since 1989, the democratizations experienced in ‘Eastern Europe’ have come to offer a range of outcomes, from the more triumphant (exemplified by the core countries of Central Europe, and the Baltics) to the less fortunate results (typified by the Balkans). Perhaps not surprisingly, in the more successful states, the political results of transformation have earned better grades than the socioeconomic consequences. To date, democratic consolidation has taken place practically in all of the states of Central Europe; a few of these states have become members of NATO and the EU, and several more are in the process of consolidating their adsorption into the EU. Economically, however, even the most successful post-communist states (with the probable exception of Slovenia, which has meanwhile even managed to hold the presidency of the EU Council) have faced serious problems resulting from their transition from a relatively egalitarian raw communist welfare state to an even cruder capitalist economy that markedly categorized and separated the ‘winners’ from the ‘losers’ in the harsh processes of self-transformation. This has generated considerable skepticism, and even pessimism, in the hearts and minds of populations for which the balance sheet of these transformations was in moral
deficit. Politically, public moods and mindsets of the sort can make it more difficult to exercise stable governance, even to sustain enduring majorities, in ways to avoid the disruption of the democratic processes. Understandably, in the least successful states, prospects have been even darker. Among the several still incapable of resolving their most urgent (economic, ethnic, and other) problems, some governments may yet—in last recourse—try to resort to undemocratic means, unless they fall into the stern hands of a legitimately elected authoritarian leadership that can preempt retroversion. And if the pressures being exercised by the EU on Bulgaria in an endeavor to elicit much needed and still pending ethical reforms at the highest echelons of state are any indication, the road to creating a system out of an aggregate in matters pan-European may be long.

In his chapter, Jerzy Wiatr argues that much will depend on the quality of the new elites.11 Comparative research has shown that Central European leaders are more likely to adapt to the values and modes of behavior that characterize stable democracies than the new leaders in the former Soviet states. Much will depend also on the way in which Western democracies will respond to the needs of the new democracies in the ‘post-communist’ states. A far more (pro-)active approach, even if it means accepting some sacrifices and costs, would appear to be in the best interests of the democratic world. But how, if at all, does a born-again Russia, in one way or another, compare with its former Communist-Socialist satellites in East and Central Europe?

The Democratization of Russian Civilian Society: Myth and Reality

“Twenty years ago, few would have predicted that Russia would soon experience an economic boom. [Its] economy had been shackled for decades by Soviet rule. It managed to produce oil, nuclear warheads, Kalashnikov rifles, and very little else of interest to the market economies in the West. Then . . . the reforms of former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, perestroika, the revolution of former President Boris Yeltsin, free markets, and billion-dollar fortunes for at least a few. But how are average Russians faring under these changes, and what challenges [lay] ahead in areas like health care, education and

11. Cf. Shlapentokh’s take on Russia and deLisle’s views on China, in this book, as to elite perceptions of threats versus opportunities in the institutional desirability of “rule by law,” for divergent pragmatic reasons but to convergent nondemocratic ends in these two countries, the motivating conveniences of which differ at this time.
employment?” queried only last year Knowledge@Wharton, that school’s newsletter.12

Titled “Russia under Putin: Toward Democracy or Dictatorship?” Stephen Kotkin’s talk at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia on February 15, 2007, put it succinctly for the audience: “Russia is not a democracy, and it is not a dictatorship. Russia, like most countries of the world, has a ramshackle authoritarian system with some democratic trappings (some of which are meaningful). Russia is not in transition to or from anything. Russia is what it is.” Reminding us that, after the United States, Russia comes second “in the number of immigrants it receives each year” (“from former Soviet republics . . . Ukraine, Armenia . . . Tajikistan, though some also come from North Korea and China,” “with more than 500,000 and perhaps up to 1 million Muslims” living in Moscow, while “more than a quarter million Russians live in London”), Kotkin stated three major dimensions for understanding Russia’s mode of existence and tilt to socio-economic-political inward/outward transformations.13

1. “The phenomenon of so-called Kremlin Inc., the now-fashionable notion that the Putin regime is like a big, single-state corporation.” Although “to outsiders, the strategy looks like centralization of all power in a disciplined pyramid . . . on the inside, the strategy looks like making sure that the ruling ‘team’, far from being united, is at each other’s throats . . . Kremlin Inc. is a political system of surface stability but turmoil underneath.” [Kremlin Inc.’s] “members compete incessantly, and in Russian politics, offense is the best defense, so they proactively go after each other’s property and people (in a so-called naezd) before waiting for rivals to go after them.”

2. “The uncannily stable nature of today’s Russian society, something we hear far less about.” Despite “an overall decline in [territorial] population at all ages . . . down to 142 million and still shrinking, despite the immigration, [Russia] has a dynamic stable society [that] owns property”: “ownership without rule of law” but nonetheless quite “widespread ownership of property,” “a stable, dynamic, growing state and corporate middle class that has a tremendous stake in stability.” Why? Well . . . “The Russian middle class is smart, and it knows that if it gets political, it could lose its property and status.” And “for the most part,

13. Professor Kotkin’s talk was cosponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Mid-Atlantic Russia Business Council. See FPRI’s e-note of March 6, 2007.
Russia’s middle class is not ready to sacrifice its position to push for the rule of law and democracy; rather, it is interested in preserving its wealth in privileged access for its children to educational institutions and to career paths. So there is no push in Russia for democracy either from the top or the middle, even though much of the middle identifies strongly with European values and institutions.” Kotkin argued that “even though there is a strong current in Russian society appreciative of order, few people mistake order for dictatorship. In fact, in conversations, there is quite a lot of criticism in Russia of Putin and of the country’s direction, especially from people who comprise the Russian state.” In the meantime, “with its hard work, entrepreneurialism, consumption patterns and tastes, demand for education, foreign travel, and networking both domestically and globally,” Russian society continues to transform the country’s socioeconomic landscape: “Russia’s social transformation is a big story, hiding, once again, in plain view.”

3. Russia’s new-gained “assertiveness, which has taken many people by surprise and which is sometimes perceived as a new threat” [but is not]. “This revived, assertive, resentful Russia is nothing to fear. Russia has state interests that are different from U.S. interests (or Japanese interests or Chinese interests). Russians are more assertive in pressing their perceived state interests, but are they effective in doing so? Have they persuaded Europe that they’re a partner in energy security by cutting off the gas to the Ukraine, or are they using their energy muscle in a way that could be compared to stepping on a rake? When you step on a rake, you smack yourself in the forehead. That’s Russian foreign policy—smacking oneself in the forehead. Energy supply looks like a point of tremendous leverage for Russia, except energy is a market, which entails a kind of codependency relationship.” Kotin went on to remind us that “the old joke about the State Planning Commission, the so-called Gosplan, was that if you put them in charge of the Sahara, there would be a shortage of sand. Well, Gazprom, the gas monopoly, is in charge of the gas in a country that has around 33 percent of world gas reserves, and Russia may be running out of gas. The problem with a market economy is that you actually have to run a company as a business, and if you do not, you will pay the price.”

As Kotkin saw it, “the overall picture in Russia, therefore, is, first, a false stability in the regime but actual instability there. The 2008 problem

(presidential elections) is one in which everyone sees Putin as a solution but he himself may actually upend their expectations. Second, Russia has a dynamic middle-class society that is stable and mostly apolitical. The middle class in Russia understands that for now, being apolitical is a winning strategy, and so it is deeply apolitical, to the disappointment of human rights and democracy activists. Third, the world will have to get used to the newly assertive Russia. Russia is not what it was in the 1990s, when it was free-falling, in an ongoing post-Soviet collapse, but rather it is a strategic power in a very important location, with its own state interests, interests that are going to conflict with others’ interests sometimes. Still, there is no need to be alarmed. The problem with viewing Russia as a major threat is that the threat is mostly to itself, not to the outside world.” In addition, remarked Kotkin: “The popular idea of a KGB takeover of the Russian political system makes a certain amount of sense. The Soviet KGB was a huge institution with massive personnel, and so, inevitably, a lot of today’s movers and shakers used to work there. But if Putin had worked in the defense ministry, the defense ministry would be “taking over” Russia. If he had worked in the gas industry, those who have made their careers in gas would be “taking over” Russia. It’s wrong to assume that because Putin comes from the KGB, and because that’s where his loyalists come from, the whole system is moving in the direction of a security regime by design. There is an element of that. Many of Putin’s colleagues sometimes do share a certain mentality—distrust of the West—but even more significantly, they belong to competing factions . . . And that’s the key point. Whereas “Kremlin Inc.” implies a team, united in a collective enterprise, most high Russian officials despise each other. They’re rivals, in charge of competing fiefdoms with overlapping jurisdictions, and they’re trying to destroy each other . . . Sometimes, the ruler will impose a temporary truce. Often, though, the ruler will instigate still more conflict, pitting already antagonistic interests against each other, so that they’ll run to him for protection and become dependent on him.” Keep in mind that “the Russian political system lacks functioning political parties or other institutionalized mechanisms of elite recruitment” and, “instead, it has an extremely personalistic system.” Leaders in Russia “appoint to positions of authority those people they went to school with, those from their hometown, those from the places where they used to work. Vladimir Putin came from St. Petersburg. Moreover, he was at the top levels in Moscow for only a short period before he became president. To assert operative control over central state institu-
tions and state-owned corporations, he seeks to appoint people who are loyal to him (sometimes [he’s] lucky and gets both competence and loyalty, but often, it’s just loyalty). Such people naturally will come from his hometown and former places of work”—they happened to be the Leningrad KGB and the St. Petersburg city government. Well, a year or so later, it turns out that the current Russian President Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev did grow up in a suburb of St. Petersburg; did, indeed, serve as now-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff; and did assume the chairmanship of Gazprom’s Board of Directors—twice. One may remember the scandals at Gazprom before then-President Putin took matters in hand and restored order. Today, Gazprom is the largest extractor of natural gas in the world, and its Gazprom Media owns Russia’s only nationwide state-independent television station, NTV, as well as Russia’s influential newspaper Izvestia, both of which have had to traverse major changes in their editorial policies upon being taken over.

As Russian-American sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh saw things after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the greatest obstacle to the formation of liberal capitalism in Russia was the continuing lack of law and order in that society. In the aftermath of the anti-Communist revolution in 1991, a common illusion emerged in Russia—and also in the West—that the destruction once and for all of the totalitarian state would spontaneously forge a new, truly civil, society, complete with democratic institutions and Western-style economic formations. In reality, during the 1990s, a peculiar pseudofeudal “new” Russian society emerged, which came to comprise a specific mix of three quite strong sectors: the bureaucratic, the oligarchic, and the criminal sectors, and only one, if very weak, ‘liberal’ sector. The post-Yeltsin regime proclaimed President Vladimir Putin’s policy of restoring order to be his main mission, an objective that would seemingly readily sacrifice democratic institutions if need be. What the data suggested, however, is that without recourse to the time-honored instruments of the old Communist state, President Putin might have faced hardships in trying

15. Which is why, suggested the article—perhaps not all that surprisingly—“there are two main public contenders to succeed Putin as president in 2008. Sergei Ivanov, [who] comes from the Leningrad KGB . . . [and] . . . Dimitrii Medvedev, [who] comes from the St. Petersburg city government. Most insiders suspect there will be a last-minute stealth candidate, in keeping with how Putin himself emerged and how he operates; others suspect that any Putin step-aside in 2008 will be more apparent than real. Only one person knows—if he in fact knows—whom he will be put forward as his successor.” Today, we all know what ensued, and how of course.
to reach that goal; that he might have had to continue to perpetuate the social and political circumstances that emerged in the mid-1990s. In chapter 8, Vladimir Shlapentokh updates those early perceptions, focusing instead on more crucial aspects of the current status and longer-term prospects for democratization in Russia along dimensions hinted by elite attitudes in present context. He observes that, by 2007, Russia had lost its early claim to “being”—or being on the way to becoming—a democratic society.

Various theories for explaining the failure of democracy have been advanced since 2000–2002. In the 1990s, when the fate of Russian democracy was not yet clear for many people, the dominant view in Russia and abroad hinged on a belief in the universalism of democracy and on the secondary importance of innate cultural traditions. In the early years of the twenty-first century, the failure of democracy in Russia became so evident that a new concept took over, suggesting that it was in reality Russia’s mass-cultural traditions that ultimately gave shape and content to the political order sweeping the country today.

Shlapentokh finds reason to attribute the major role in this backsliding of democracy in Russia to the political elites. For him, it was the elites who chose the avenue to an authoritarian society, not because of mass political culture, but because of their own selfish appetites and ultimately because of the illegitimacy of their ever-cumulating sizeable fortunes, acquired literally overnight.

The illegal and often crude criminal origins of their fortunes caused these spontaneous elites to worry about what law enforcement agencies in the West and inside Russia might do. They have been even more worried about the imaginable reactions of the Russian population, the majority of which remains cynical as to the legality of the property held by big corporations. The nightmare of an “orange revolution” in the making, however unfounded, hounded private elites incessantly. But because of their illicitly acquired property, even the public elites in charge of wholly official positions could not wish upon themselves an independent parliament, let alone a life in an autonomous judicial system. Irrevocably and indubitably brought to light, the insatiable greed of the new elites, private and public, and their comparably conspicuous addictions to demonstrative consumption would rebuff any allegations as to the critical role that Russian cultural traditions might have played in such malign developments. As all too amply illustrated throughout Russian classical literature, Russian masses always were,
and—argues Shlapentokh—remain, deeply hostile toward big wealth and social polarization.

Disdainful of many of the values in the Russian tradition, the ruling elites were able to foment certain elements in Russian culture in ways that best suited their own selfish interests and pursuits at any given moment. The dissemination of “authoritarian ideology” among the people is hence a direct result of a Kremlin-orchestrated public propaganda that continues to seek to awaken nostalgia for a long-gone Soviet empire, to foment jungle patriotism, to fuel xenophobia, and to exploit the disenchantment of the Russian masses against the very first cohort of elites—that of post-1991 vintage. It seems unlikely that mere continuity in change may engender a democratic rule of law for as long as the spontaneously overfattened Russian elites remain wary of some “rule of law” catching up to them from above or from the flanks, or worse—a possible if more and more improbable Colored Revolution pulling the carpet out from under their feet.

How has China fared, and can China’s democratization in the (much) longer run prove comparable to what purportedly has been already partly attained in Russia under the guise of liberalization?

**China: Development without Democratization?**

In a talk some time ago at the FPRI in Philadelphia, Victor Mair (2007) reminded the audience that as “one of the most diverse nations on earth,” China “linguistically, ethnically, religiously—on virtually any basis . . . has always had an enormous range of populations and cultural phenomena. It is precisely because of this great social and cultural variety that it has been hard to keep the country together. To maintain political unity has invariably necessitated the exercise of heavy-handed government from the center.” China’s history for the last 3,500 years documents this lesson very clearly. Whenever the central government is weak or relaxes control, the nation rapidly dissolves into a mass of warring regional and ideological factions. The current government in Beijing is no doubt keenly aware of this history and is consequently fiercely determined not to share power with any group or constituency, be it Falun Gong practitioners, Cantonese merchants and

16. On the comparative merits of heavy-handed government from the center regarding political foundations of economic development (precisely in a territorially vast span such as China), see Holt and Turner (1966) for a complementary perspective.
manufacturers, or Manchurian labor leaders and industrialists.” Whereas among the ancient Chinese works, Sun Zi’s *Art of War* (*Sun Zi bingfa*) dwells on military and business applications, the *Dao De Jing*, like nearly all early works of Chinese thought, was intended primarily as a guidebook for rulers.

“. . . [It] advised that the most effective way to govern was through *wuwei* (inaction . . . ‘nonaction’ . . . ‘disinterested action’ . . . ‘action without attachment’). It is similar to the principles advocated in the ancient Indian classic *Bhagavad Gita.*” The perspective that Mair contextualizes here is that whereas “virtually all early schools of Chinese thought accepted *dao* and *de* as basic components of their reasoning . . . their interpretations of the terms differed greatly.” And while “for some, *dao* (literally, ‘the Way’) was a universal, cosmic principle, like Brahman in the Indian tradition . . . for others, *dao* was more like a method or technique, rather mundane in comparison with the former approach. The differences in understanding *de* were equally great. For those like the Taoists, who looked upon *dao* as universal, cosmic principle, *de* was its manifestation in the individual (‘power’ is one popular translation; I might prefer ‘charisma’), whereas for the Confucians, *de* was an ethical concept very close to English *virtue.* Unfortunately, people have a tendency to translate *de* as *virtue* in all cases, and sometimes it is wholly inappropriate, as when we talk of inferior *de* or evil *de.* The source of our word *virtue*, Latin *virtus*, would do as a general translation for *de*, as it means manliness, inner strength of character, and that is very close to what the old Chinese word *de* meant.” Why, one might ask, this preamble here? Because it will impart cultural context when interpreting the insights offered in deLisle’s chapter 9, which examines a resilient puzzle (development without democratization?) in China:

“The Confucians and the Taoists were at odds on almost every issue about how human beings should relate to each other in society. The Confucians stressed *li* (civility, etiquette, ritual), *ren* (humaneness, benevolence), and *yi* (justice, righteousness), among other related, ethical concepts. The Taoists, in contrast, believed either that these concepts were ineffectual or that they actually jinxed human relationships. They would permit people to behave more naturally, freed of artificial norms and constraints. But the Taoist and Confucian outlooks were by no means the only two positions on the spectrum of early Chinese thought. Among numerous other schools were the Mohists (followers of Mo Zi [Master Mo]), who displayed great affinity with
Christianity in emphasizing the need for universal love; the egoists (epicureans/hedonists) who advocated self-interest and personal enjoyment above all; the technicians, who believed that skillful methods were all that was necessary to run a smoothly functioning government, and perforce, society; and the Legalists, who insisted that the only way to ensure a peaceful, orderly society was through the rigorous, inflexible application of law. In the end, the Legalists won out, as might well be expected, considering the chaotic situation that had to be overcome. It was the short-lived (221 to 206 B.C.E.), legalistic Qin Dynasty that established the fundamental bureaucratic institutions by means of which China was governed for the next 2,200 years—when it was governed at all, that is, as there was a succession of many dynasties and almost constant contestation for power, often erupting into rebellions, revolutions, and full-scale war,” Mair reminds us in his FPRI article. But, one may ask, after so many revolutions and counter-revolutions and the extensive periods of illiteracy that have accompanied each of these shocks and countershocks, how many Chinese have read or still remember their imperial history, their ancient philosophers and ancestral traditions, let alone heed ‘old lessons’ in a ‘new era’? After long decades of Communist rule, was it not surprising how quickly and intensely both the Russian masses and the Russian elites seem to have taken to the elaborate practice of Orthodox rites, and with what joy and pride they seem to have welcomed anew the majestic pageantry that so regally accentuates those private practices in full public view? It remains nevertheless true that China’s philosophical ways and Russia’s religious fervor cannot be expected to have an impact on their respective societies in identical ways to comparable extents.

Reflecting on the decades traversed by China since Mao to date, Melanie Manion (2007) suggests that if “the phrase that best characterizes the Maoist era is ‘never forget class struggle’ . . .” by contrast, the mantra (harmonious society) that the Communist Party has endorsed most recently “is distinctly un-Maoist, even somewhat Confucian,” for “it is a long way from class struggle to harmonious society.” Manion argues that “Mao was able to invoke his cult of personality, control of the army, and historically ‘best guesses’ to outmaneuver his colleagues, often with end-runs around formal organizations and procedures. This was evident in the rapid pace of agricultural collectivization after 1955, the radicalization of the Great Leap Forward after the Lushan Plenum in 1959, and [in the] destruction of the CCP in the Cultural Revolution.” In contrast, today, “there is a tremendous
concentration of decision-making power at the top of the Chinese political system, in fewer than a dozen leaders on the Politburo Standing Committee. The Party is organized hierarchically and dominates governance in organizations and localities from top to bottom. . . . And this concentration of power produces a lack of open debate on policies and a smaller pool of ideas.”

Hence, deems Manion, “today, power is no longer as concentrated as in the Maoist era or even under Deng Xiaoping in the post-Mao era. Economic power has been significantly decentralized. Politically, the cult of personality has been officially repudiated and collective leadership promoted.” Indeed, “neither Hu Jintao nor Wen Jiabao [has] the stature of a Mao or a Deng. In policymaking, central agencies rely on their own think tanks as well as research institutes outside the Party and government. Businesses, including foreign businesses, regularly lobby government departments about laws and regulations that affect their bottom line. There is greater transparency in policymaking. Of course, mass media openness has been severely curtailed in recent years.” One might agree with Manion that this situation is unlikely to improve at a fast pace—it was not emphatically better after the 17th Party Congress in fall 2007 and problems with Internet access lingered on the late eve of the Olympics in August 2008. Still, the media is not the slavish Party instrument of the Maoist era, suggests Manion, and one has to agree.

In chapter 9, jurist and China-specialist Jacques deLisle is unambiguous about China’s position in reference to democratization: for more than a quarter century, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been pursuing a distinctive strategy toward achieving economic development while avoiding political democratization. And it has been doing so in part by relying on law to support development and forestall pressures for democracy. This ‘implicit’ PRC model poses the greatest of all contemporary challenges to the post–Cold War conventional wisdom (which echoes an earlier postwar conventional wisdom) that markets, democracy, and the rule of law go together.

In many respects, the PRC’s approach to pursuing development without democracy (or a strong rule of law) resembles the East Asian model that emerged from the industrialization experiences of the four “tiger” economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) and, before them, Japan. But there indeed are also significant divergences between the East Asian model (itself, intramurally diverse) and reform-era China’s distinct pursuit of increasingly market-oriented,
internationally open, economic development: its very own version of authoritarian politics and the roles it has expected law to perform.

The implicit Chinese model has been particularly distinctive with respect to the roles of law (this is a point on which the other exemplars of the East Asian model differ greatly): in China, law is to help build frameworks for markets that will foster development and thereby also provide the people with rising wealth—an effect that putatively will ‘buy off’ pressures for democratization. Law is to substitute for democracy in providing development-sustaining mechanisms (those of monitoring and controlling economically harmful Party-state behavior) and law is to forestall demand for some of democracy’s more political functions by providing insulation from (noneconomic) official misbehavior, few and very limited means for accountability of officials, and just as low and limited a popular input into the governance of that people’s own country.

The difficulty the East Asian model has encountered in recent years (long after its exemplar states had industrialized) has limited implications for reform-era China’s pursuit of development without democracy. Attempts to draw lessons from such developments, and thus to vindicate the post–Cold War conventional wisdom, are made even more problematic by China’s lower level of development and belated international integration, its sheer inability to use some classic East Asian model methods, its significantly different modes of pursuing development, its avoidance of democracy, its use of law to just that effect, and other differences in circumstance as well.

But this implicit Chinese model faces growing difficulties in sustaining the pace of development, in avoiding or quelling pressures for democratization, and in building a legal order sufficient for law to fulfill its expected roles. Nonetheless, and even if the post–Cold War conventional wisdom is right, the reform-era Chinese approach, which has survived and adapted for more than two decades now, may yet provide a successful transition or even evolve into a viable long-term solution.

This constructive and positively hopeful perspective by deLisle is not shared by those who see darker connections between a state’s pragmatic pursuit of undemocratic governance, a nation’s complicit accommodation, and its citizenry’s opportunistic indifference to the lack of an ethic of freedom and to the long-term implications of such a void, however. Edward Friedman (2007), for one, deems that “what is growing in China is an authoritarian, patriotic, racially defined,
Confucian Chinese project, which is going to be a formidable challenge not just to the United States but . . . to democracy, freedom, and human rights all around the world”; that “China’s rise means that freedom is in trouble”; that “the era we’re in is very much like the era after WWI. Authoritarian models are rising and are becoming more attractive”; that hence, naturally one “can imagine a future in which unregulated hedge funds lead to an international financial crisis [which is] seen as coming out of the Anglo-American countries, London, and New York being the two centers of these monies” [“China regulates capital, so these things are not allowed in”] and that therefore “the Chinese model may yet look even more attractive than it does now.” Indeed, argues Friedman, “China is going to seem quite attractive to many people,” because “the Chinese regime has fostered a nationalism to trump democracy. People are taught that they are threatened by democracy, that democracy would make people weak. [As Chinese] Party propaganda [phrases] it, ‘How did Rwanda occur? Because they tried to build a democracy. If the Hutus had simply imposed their will, they never would have had that problem. [Thus] if it moves in a democratic direction, China is going to fall apart; [things] will be like what happened to Russia, to Yugoslavia. Do you [Chinese] want to end up like Chechnya and Bosnia? That’s what the Americans really want. You are fortunate to be Chinese living in an ethical, authoritarian system.’ The TV will show pictures of say the Los Angeles riots, the Sudan, and people are made frightened and confused. They’re proud to be Chinese and want to raise ethical kids. They want a country they can be proud of, certainly not like American kids. The Chinese are taught that American youth are smoking at an early age, use pot, have babies in their teens, watch pornography on TV, spread AIDS, get divorced, and don’t care what happens to their elderly parents. Why would you want to live in such an immoral way? This propaganda seems to work with many Chinese” (Friedman 2007). Whichever the truer, or the more perspicacious, among these extant perspectives, it likely will take quite some time for democracy to blossom inside China and for democratization to be pursued—whether with a bottom-up and/or top-down approach. While the expectation that China’s experience of an instant multifaceted all-encompassing interface of global import on its own home territory, on the occasion of the 2008 Olympics, might unleash in it a sudden urge to transform itself into an open society would be slightly overoptimistic, the very opportunity ought to be seen as
nevertheless enabling yet another small step to be taken in a long march to far happier tomorrows.

Democratizations in Africa: Attempts, Hindrances, and Prospects

Stephen Brown and Paul Kaiser, the authors of chapter 10, are political scientists with an expertise and corresponding field experience in Africa. Their chapter suggests that experiences differ so widely in Africa that one can only speak of democratization in the plural. Although most countries were granted independence under a multiparty system, military rule and one-party states began to typify African regimes all too soon. Some underwent crippling civil wars, from which a few are only beginning to emerge, and some even experienced ‘state collapse’. After 1989, however, Africa witnessed a sudden resurgence of democracy. The vast majority of countries in Africa held multiparty elections, albeit of widely divergent quality. In some places, dictators peacefully ceded power to elected opposition leaders. In others, the ruling party controlled the process to ensure it would not lose power. And in a few cases, military coups reversed previous gains. Even if the results were often disappointing or short lived, the continent of Africa during the 1990s was swept by a wave of democratization unseen for a generation. And this phenomenon warrants much closer study in the framework of our worldwide scrutiny here.

In their chapter on this puzzling topic, Brown and Kaiser survey a representative array of African democratizations. They use as categorical examples four sub-Saharan countries, each of which offers different insights into postcolonial democratic experiences on the African continent: Botswana has enjoyed decades of uninterrupted multiparty politics (but single-party rule) under a political system that mixes Western-style liberal democracy with traditional top-down structures. Benin has democratized rapidly, in relatively successful fashion since 1989, after a long period of dictatorial rule, hence providing a ‘transition model’ for several other African countries. Kenya’s former ruling party reluctantly permitted a multiparty system in 1991 but resisted all further democratization, and thus remained in power for another decade, by manipulating (at times violently) the transition process. In Burundi, on the other hand, democracy was severely undermined in 1993, when army extremists assassinated the new president—(the first one to be freely elected) and raised waves of retributive ‘ethnic’ violence that have recently subsided but not yet ended. These four
cases are drawn from each of the four regions of sub-Saharan Africa (West, East, Central, and Southern), thus also reflecting the main colonial legacies (two former British colonies, one French, and one Belgian) that have marked Africa. Are there any generalizable insights, any “lessons,” to harvest here?

After presenting each case, the authors proceed to explore competing explanations for success and failure in democratic pursuits, transitions, and survival, by focusing on voluntaristic and structural factors particularly relevant to the continent. They use a comparative case study approach, supplemented by comparative thematic investigations, and this provides the authors with the opportunity to consider the continent’s grave impediments to democratization and to ponder how those might be overcome while also critically evaluating any suitable alternatives to the dominant Western model of liberal democracy, such as those explored by some of the other chapters of this book in other parts of the world, where displacements enter the equation.

Immigration and Democratization: Crossing the Mexico-U.S. Border

Precisely because international migration involves the crossing of borders, it also holds very significant potential for challenging authoritarian rule in migrant-sending countries. It does so—argue demographer-sociologist Douglas Massey and his co-author Mara Pérez, who is also a sociologist with broad expertise on Latin America—by removing large numbers of people from repressive co-optive controls imposed by authoritarian regimes to maintain power. Drawing on many examples from Latin America, Massey and Pérez demonstrate how international migration can produce conditions favorable to political mobilization against repressive regimes. They enumerate the specific characteristics likely to promote a movement for democratization among the members of a diaspora: large numbers, high circularity, a politically open host society, geographic concentration, unmistakable accumulation of resources, and free markets in the country of origin.

Their chapter illustrates all these characteristics with many examples from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. The role played by international migrants in the pro-democracy movement is described in detail for Mexico, a country whose diaspora has been the largest. Mexico’s long history of migration and of settlement ‘north of the border’ created conditions particularly favorable to democratic mobilization.
In the mid-1980s, Mexican migrants in the United States became increasingly active as participants in the struggle for democracy within Mexico. Mexicans living north of the border thus mobilized to support opposition parties of both the left and the right during the 1988, 1994, and 2000 presidential elections, raising money, holding rallies, lobbying U.S. authorities, and establishing nongovernmental organizations to monitor Mexican politics. The diaspora demanded and received recognition of dual nationality, and expatriates were granted the right to vote in national elections, at least in principle, if not yet in practice. Migrants were one of the key constituents pushing for the creation of an electoral institute to manage and supervise elections independently. Such was the influence of the diaspora by the end of the twentieth century that visits on the part of rather important Mexican politicians to large expatriate communities in Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and other locations north of the border had become routine.

The movement toward democratization crested in 2000, with the first free election of a Mexican president in decades and the ouster of the political party that had monopolized power for some 70 years. Mexican democracy is now more open than it ever has been, and, in a very real way, Mexican migrants have served as the catalyst for this felicitous transformation. The tangible contribution of international migration to democratization is not limited to Latin America, of course, and the potential for immigrants’ diasporas to contribute to democratic transitions elsewhere in the world is very real. Real also is the struggle for some categories of peoples in such diasporas to find their niches in their newfound environments: the processes of democratization seem to gain in complexity in sending and receiving countries via the novel conditions created by noncitizen diasporas. And in contexts of compounding heterogeneity, communication becomes a crucial prerequisite in the complex pursuit of democratization.

Voice, Participation, and the Globalization of Communication Systems

Hopes for democratization, both in its small- and large-scale manifestations, hinge fundamentally on communication among citizens. As new communication technologies (NCTs) increasingly procreate and consolidate the globalization of these flows of communication, a

17. See Gutiérrez (2008) for an argumentation that provides a complementary perspective by examining diasporic impact on the receiving country’s democratization and on the civic ethic of its home-grown citizenry.
systematic interrogation of the implications for, and the impact on, democracy is required. In chapter 12, the late James P. McDaniel and his colleagues Timothy Kuhn and Stanley Deetz, from the Department of Communication at the University of Colorado-Boulder, examine the development of, and the discourse over, NCTs from a strong theory of communication. The trio draws a useful distinction between concepts of communication as transmission and visions of communication as dialogue, by suggesting that although the former conceptualization is a more prevalent mode of understanding human interaction, the latter offers greater conceptual purchase on the technological shaping of human subjectivities and open communities. From the issues raised by the communication-as-dialogue perspective, they elicit three themes in NCT development discourse with clear implications for democratic participation; with these now in hand, they draw on the pertinent work of Jürgen Habermas to develop a normative foundation for communication technology policy that can contribute to much stronger and future-friendlier versions of democracy.

Democratic Prospects in Undemocratic Times

As the concluding chapter by political theorist Patrick Deneen reminds us, however, the richness of the book’s contributions ought not to help buffer the fact that, as processes, democratizations are less plural than may appear at first blush. Beneath the unmistakable diversity of purposeful pursuits of “democratization,” there still is nevertheless a clear singular conception of “democracy” that reflects the reigning philosophy of modern liberalism. Resting on the basis of consent (and hence on the view that politics is conventional and that humans are to be conceived as naturally individualistic) and situating as its central goals human autonomy, economic growth, efficiency, and the professionalization of politics, ‘modern’ forms of democracy might be judged insufficiently democratic when compared and confronted with competing conceptions of democracy. By contrast, ancient political theory used to hold that democracy rested on equal political rule—not merely through periodic elections, but via active participation in self-governance—while at the same time emphasizing the development of a certain ‘democratic character’ apt to encourage self-governance and mutual concern in the civic sphere.

In light of this comparison, “democratizations” may appear less plausible than is suggested, even though some evidence of this more ancient sense of civic democracy may have been temporarily visible in the aftermath of the tragedy of September 11, 2001—the day the two World Trade Center Towers in New York were destroyed and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., was attacked by those few for whom the tallest monetary and strongest military symbols of advanced capitalism and the deepest foundations of advanced democracy are but one and the same.

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